by C.J. Miller (Hoosier Ag) National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) leadership is calling out the federal government after USDA admitted late Friday to a major data processing error in its September crop reporting—a mistake corn industry leaders say severely damaged grain markets at the worst possible time for Midwest producers.
In a sharp rebuke issued Friday, NCGA President Matt Frostic, a Michigan farmer, condemned the error, linking recent USDA reporting shifts directly to sharp sell-offs in corn futures that have hammered farm balance sheets across the country.
“Recent reports by NASS have cost corn growers BILLIONS of dollars in market value, at a time when profit margins were already marginal, at best, and the cost for fuel and other inputs are at all-time highs,” Frostic stated. “Corn prices dropped in conjunction with the release of recent reports and have only continued to drop. An error of this magnitude is unacceptable, and only further erodes farmer confidence in the agency’s ability to produce statistically sound and accurate reports.
“NASS needs to seriously examine the processes and procedures that led to this mistake and take immediate action to prevent it from occurring again. We are anxious to meet with the service to understand their plans for improvement and how they intend to rebuild farmer confidence in these reports,” said Frostic.
Frostic’s warning comes on the heels of an official statement released Oct. 23 by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). The agency acknowledged that a technical processing error corrupted September corn plant populations, ear counts, yields, and production data for Kansas and Nebraska, while also distorting 10-state Midwest averages and national yield forecasts.
Corrected Baseline, Unchanged Forecast
While NASS quietly updated its database to fix the September baseline—raising Nebraska’s September yield estimate from 177 to 182 bushels per acre and lifting the September U.S. average from 178.5 to 178.8 bushels—the agency refused to adjust its controversial October projections.
NASS emphasized that its Oct. 9 forecast of a 181.2-bushel-per-acre national average yield and a total 16-billion-bushel crop was reviewed, validated, and remains entirely unchanged.
For NCGA and state commodity groups, that decision leaves unresolved questions. Much of the October report’s market-shaking yield hike originated in Nebraska, where NASS originally reported an 11-bushel month-over-month jump (from 177 to 188). By revising September’s baseline up to 182, NASS reframed that increase as a 6-bushel gain—yet the market sell-off triggered by the initial October numbers remains unaddressed.
Regional Fallout for Indiana and Michigan Producers
Frostic’s focus on the financial impact hits close to home for producers across Indiana and Michigan who are currently finishing up harvest:
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Cash Market Pressure: Because NASS held its national production forecast above 16 billion bushels, futures prices remain depressed. Local elevators, river terminals, and processors throughout the Eastern Corn Belt continue to reflect that heavy national paper supply in weak cash bids and compressed basis.
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Marginal Yields and Tight Margins: Weather variability across northern Indiana and Michigan’s Thumb meant many fields produced average or slightly below-average yields. With low crop prices failing to cover high fixed seed, fertilizer, and fuel costs, farmers are feeling an intense margin squeeze.
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Marketing Strategy Disruptions: The sequence of report updates and sudden price drops has complicated fall marketing decisions, forcing growers to evaluate whether to sell grain off the combine at a discount or absorb commercial storage costs into the winter.
Restoring Trust in Federal Statistics
As harvest wraps up across the Midwest, grower leaders emphasize that transparent and reliable federal data is vital for risk management, crop insurance, and daily grain marketing.
While NASS indicated it is exploring expanded technology and automation to prevent future calculation mistakes, NCGA maintains that restoring producer trust will require far greater accuracy and accountability from the agency moving forward. READ MORE
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Excerpt from Farm Policy News: AgroLatam’s Marcus Ellington reported that “the revisions have renewed debate over the influence of USDA crop reports on corn futures, farm profitability and grain marketing strategies.”
“For U.S. farmers, the controversy extends beyond statistical accuracy. USDA forecasts influence commodity prices, crop insurance decisions, storage strategies and financial planning across the agricultural supply chain,” Ellington reported. “Questions about data reliability have also emerged following federal workforce reductions that raised concerns about the agency’s technical capacity. As producers navigate tight margins and rising production expenses, transparent and dependable crop estimates remain critical to market confidence and agricultural competitiveness.”
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Ag Policy and Markets Daily’s Jim Wiesemeyer wrote that “the correction resolves an important Nebraska data inconsistency and substantially reduces the apparent monthly yield jump. It leaves October’s larger national crop forecast standing — and leaves NASS with the task of explaining how an error that affected market-sensitive forecasts passed through its publication controls. And why did it take so long for NASS to issue a correction?” READ MORE
Excerpt from AgroLatam: The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) corrected its September corn production estimates on October 23, 2026 , after identifying a processing error affecting yield calculations in Nebraska and Kansas. The review has intensified concerns analysts among farmers, grain traders and agriculturals about the reliability of federal crop forecasts. READ MORE
Excerpt from Reuters/Successful Farming: Earlier this month, a sharp increase in the USDA’s estimate for Nebraska’s yield from September helped boost the national average, hurt crop prices, and drew skepticism from farmers and analysts. The increase would have been smaller if USDA had correctly reported its September yield estimate last month.
The Nebraska Corn Board, in a letter obtained by Reuters, called on NASS last week to explain the increased yield estimate in October and whether NASS flubbed the September estimate.
“The yield adjustment doesn’t follow any logic in using data within the crop production report or weekly crop progress, specifically crop ratings,” said Kelly Brunkhorst, the board’s executive director, in the letter. “Nebraska corn farmers deserve answers!”
The USDA on Friday revised its national September yield estimate to 178.8 bushels per acre from the original September estimate of 178.5 bushels per acre. October crop forecasts were reviewed, validated and have not changed, according to the agency.
The USDA previously said it was launching a pilot project that will rely more heavily on technology as part of a broader effort to improve crop acreage and yield estimates.
Thousands of employees left USDA last year as part of President Donald Trump’s drive to shrink the federal government, and experts worry the staff reductions hobbled the agency’s ability to produce accurate and timely data. READ MORE
Excerpt from AgWeb: For context, USDA’s August forecast for Nebraska was 183 bu. per acre, so the September-to-October jump more than recovered a drop in between. The size of the increase raised questions about how Nebraska could see such a major change in a single month.
The controversy intensified after analysts examined the field sample data. In September, the data suggested 90% of Nebraska fields sampled were nonirrigated, with only 10% irrigated. In October, the balance of ear counts was more typical, with 55% irrigated and 45% nonirrigated.
The samples are collected by the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) for USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service. The shift prompted farmers and analysts to question why irrigated fields appeared to make up such a small share of the September sample.
As AgBull.com’s Jim Wiesemeyer points out, Friday’s correction only proves a processing error, not a proven fieldwork failure.
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The big question in Nebraska, according to Meyer, was why enumerators didn’t reach more irrigated fields in September. Irrigated and nonirrigated ground is “sprinkled amongst each other,” he says, so he wonders whether a geographic problem kept crews out of certain areas.
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“The number that’s printed is the number that the algorithms trade. It clearly changes the trajectory of everything that we’ve thought for some time,” says Matt Bennett, of AgMarket.Net. READ MORE; includes VIDEO
by Jefferson dos Santos Estevo* (Advanced Biofuels USA) Next Sunday, October 25, Brazil will elect its president for the next term. The candidates are the incumbent president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the Workers’ Party (PT), who is seeking re-election, and Liberal Party (PL) candidate Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. Their government platforms differ on a range of issues. This analysis focuses on the main proposals related to the energy transition.
Flávio Bolsonaro
In Flávio Bolsonaro’s government platform, energy is addressed on pages 52–53 under the heading “Abundant and affordable energy means lower electricity bills and an industry with its doors open,” which appears to encapsulate the candidate’s approach. The opening paragraph emphasizes gas, including the “development of unconventional gas through fracking,” and states, “we will turn our oil and gas wealth into energy and jobs” (...) “by breaking the monopoly, opening the sector to competition, and creating the conditions for lower gas prices.” The platform then addresses oil: “we will encourage the modernization of refining to make better use of domestic oil.” However, it provides few details about the measures envisaged beyond improving distribution. This suggests that the candidate intends to expand fossil-fuel extraction, particularly natural gas, with specific emphasis on “fracking”—a practice whose legal status in Brazil remains under judicial consideration and which raises environmental and public-health concerns.
Further on, the candidate promises to reduce electricity bills, highlighting the “gradual reduction of the Energy Development Account (CDE) and of incentives for subsidized energy sources, while maintaining the social electricity tariff.” The platform does not clarify how this would be implemented; it states only that the social tariff would be maintained. Nevertheless, reducing the CDE could affect incentives for renewable energy, including solar and wind power. In the same paragraph, again emphasizing price, the platform stresses the importance of “attracting data centers and artificial intelligence, which locate where energy is cheap and reliable,” and of “turning the country into a global hub for sustainable data centers.” It is difficult to determine what “sustainable” means in this complex context, particularly because the renewable share of Brazil’s energy mix is not the only relevant variable.
Finally, and most importantly for this section, low-emission fuels appear in a single paragraph. The platform states: “we will turn Brazil into a biofuel powerhouse: ethanol, biodiesel, HVO, SAF, and biogas, promoting the implementation of the Future Fuels Law and offering special financing lines for biogas companies that turn waste into energy.” This amounts to continuing policies already under way, once again without specifying what will be done or how it will be carried out.
One passage that summarizes the candidate’s approach deserves particular attention: “Our clean energy and sustainability are competitive advantages underpinning this vision: our goal for 2030 is to position Brazil among the world’s leading destinations for investment in the energy transition, with biofuels, solar power, wind power, and green hydrogen as key drivers, and diplomacy as a permanent instrument.” In other words, energy transition is an important issue in his campaign.
The platform then proposes, in similarly vague terms, to “strengthen and expand the Renovabio Program internationally, allowing Brazil to sell carbon credits to the world.” What this would mean in practice is unclear. It is not evident whether the intention is to improve renewable-fuel certification by using Renovabio as the basis for calculating emissions, or to pursue some other approach.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
In his re-election platform, Lula devotes approximately five pages (63–69) to energy. Its central heading is “Strengthening Energy Security and Leading the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy.” The energy transition is therefore prominent from the outset. The platform goes on to emphasize “greater coordination of electricity, oil, gas, biofuel, and green hydrogen policies around a coherent, long-term national strategy for a just energy transition.” It highlights the National Energy Transition Policy (PNTE), launched under the current administration, which aims at the “transformation of the energy mix toward a structure that combines a stable supply, emissions reductions, and economic and socio-environmental development.”
The text then reviews the current government’s achievements, highlighting investment across the energy sector, from biofuels to oil. As in Flávio Bolsonaro’s platform, natural gas is considered important: “the role of natural gas and biomethane as complements to renewable energy sources will continue to be encouraged, strengthening energy security.” It also states that “natural gas infrastructure will continue to expand and become more integrated in order to increase supply, extend transmission and distribution networks inland, and strengthen South American gas integration.” The platform does not mention fracking, but it does support continued fossil-fuel development through new oil exploration: “Petrobras will continue to expand onshore and offshore exploration investments to regain a greater share of control over national reserves.”
A subsequent passage is particularly noteworthy: “We also believe that Petrobras should continue to help drive the energy transition, in alignment with the Paris Agreement and Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), through investment in low-carbon sources and effective reductions in operational emissions.” Thus, despite continued support for fossil fuels, the platform also expresses a commitment to decarbonization. This is one of the differences between the two government platforms, as discussed below.
In the electricity sector, the platform states that the “fight against energy poverty has been pursued through Luz do Povo, which revised the social electricity tariff and expanded free electricity for families registered in the Single Registry (Cadastro Único) with monthly consumption of up to 80 kWh, reaching more than 60 million people.” The proposal also prioritizes modernization of the electricity system through transmission expansion, hydropower repowering, batteries, and a gradual reduction in coal use, with the aim of integrating renewable sources and lowering tariffs. Finally, it stresses the need to “incorporate climate risks as a mandatory variable in planning” to strengthen the system’s resilience.
In the area of low-emission fuels, the platform highlights progress, particularly through the Future Fuels Law, which received full government support during its passage and was signed into law by President Lula in 2024. The platform commits to continuing and expanding the initiatives associated with the law: “we will continue efforts to develop technologies and expand sustainable fuels (SAF, biomethane, and marine fuels), accelerating the implementation of decarbonization policies.” SAF is mentioned explicitly, reflecting the need for further progress as targets are set to begin in 2027. The platform states: “The New Growth Acceleration Program (Novo PAC) portfolio also demonstrates this progress by including eight second-generation ethanol plants and Brazil’s first two biorefineries dedicated to SAF production.” It also mentions “biomethane, co-processed diesel, carbon capture and storage, hydrogen studies, and other energy-transition technologies.”
Lula’s platform also addresses hydrogen and points to legislative progress: “The Legal Framework for Low-Carbon Hydrogen established the national policy, Rehidro, and PHBC, with guidelines for technological neutrality, legal certainty, financing, and innovation to enable hydrogen to compete in Brazil’s energy mix.” This is a relevant component of the energy transition.
The platform also points to progress in decarbonizing road transport through the following measure: “the mandatory biofuel-blending requirements were increased from 27% to 32% ethanol in gasoline (E32) and from 10% to 15% biodiesel in diesel (B15), strengthening demand for biofuels and making Brazil a reference point for transport decarbonization.”
The most significant difference between the two campaigns concerns the priority given to climate issues and the extent to which the energy transition is framed as a long-term project. This is clear in the closing section of Lula’s platform: “Strengthening the energy system’s resilience to climate change is a strategic priority, requiring climate risks to be incorporated as a mandatory variable in planning.”
Analysis
The energy transition is essential to mitigating climate change. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2025), “the deployment of solar photovoltaics, wind power, nuclear energy, electric cars, and heat pumps since 2019 now avoids 2.6 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions annually, equivalent to 7% of global emissions.” In this context, Flávio Bolsonaro’s platform states that it views “the environment as a strategic asset, not an obstacle to development.” Although it sets “the goal of eliminating illegal deforestation by 2029,” the platform repeatedly frames environmental preservation in terms of capital and profit. Most notably, it makes no reference to global warming or climate change. This omission is consistent with the candidate’s climate-skeptical position, as reflected in an interview this year in which the senator said he believes extreme weather events are cyclical phenomena, disregarding decades of scientific evidence.
For those who followed his father’s administration, this approach may come as little surprise. Jair Bolsonaro’s government adopted positions similar to those of Donald Trump’s administration in the United States, including climate skepticism and support for Brazil’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, as the United States had done.
By contrast, the Lula government has sought to restore climate policy to the center of the national agenda. As its platform states, “In the field of climate change, Brazil has resumed ambitious planning supported by a strong institutional foundation.” It adds: “The ecological transformation is a historic opportunity for Brazil in the twenty-first century. It is not a cost to be paid, but a pathway to the country’s development.”
In conclusion, although both platforms propose maintaining and expanding activities related to the energy transition, they differ significantly in their priorities and underlying rationale. Lula’s campaign gives greater prominence to the urgency of climate change, emissions mitigation, and the links between energy policy, industrial development, and national and international climate commitments. This approach is reflected in its support for decarbonization policies, low-emission fuels, and the integration of climate risks into energy planning. Flávio Bolsonaro’s platform, by contrast, emphasizes affordable energy, the exploitation of natural resources, and economic competitiveness, while offering few energy-policy guidelines explicitly connected to climate change. This orientation is consistent with the climate skepticism expressed by the candidate and with positions associated with Bolsonarismo and Donald Trump’s political camp.
The difference, therefore, does not lie in the absolute presence or absence of energy-transition initiatives, since both candidates refer to renewable energy sources and biofuels. Rather, it concerns the role climate change plays in their respective development projects. This distinction shows that the energy transition is not merely a technological or economic challenge, but also a political choice shaped by development priorities, climate responsibility, and the role Brazil intends to play in international environmental governance.
* Jefferson dos Santos Estevo is a researcher in International Relations and Energy Transition at the Center of Excellence in Hydrogen and Sustainable Energy Technologies (CEHTES) at the Federal University of Goiás. FAPEG Research Fellow. He holds a doctorate in Social Sciences from the University of Campinas.
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Excerpt from CNN: The Brazilian president’s remarkable comeback against his right-wing rival, Flávio Bolsonaro, also set another record. Since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985, no president has managed to overturn a first-round defeat. The Workers’ Party candidate added more than 10 million votes in the three weeks between the two rounds of voting, while his rival gained just 3.6 million.
The margin was decisive enough for Lula to secure a larger lead than he did in 2022, when he defeated Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio’s father and the incumbent president at the time. The comeback also allows Lula to remain the leading figure of the regional left as the right advances in other countries across Latin America, many of whose governments are now aligned with Donald Trump’s White House.
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As his father did four years ago, Flávio Bolsonaro refused to recognize the result and announced that he would seek to have the election annulled through the courts.
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Yet Bolsonaro’s defeat does not weaken the right’s grip on Congress and state governments. That is the paradox of Lula’s next term: a historic electoral triumph and limited room to govern.
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The push was accompanied by last-minute measures and proposals aimed at voters’ concrete concerns. Lula signed into law a measure raising the revenue threshold for individual microentrepreneurs, proposed new initiatives to renegotiate consumer debt and advocated ending online betting, whose expansion has contributed to household indebtedness.
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“Lula faces a very different political environment from the one that existed when he first took office, during the pink tide. Back then, he had several regional allies and could play both sides to Brazil’s advantage,” Michael Paarlberg, an associate professor of political science at Virginia Commonwealth University and a researcher at the Center for International Policy (CIP), a Washington-based think tank, told CNN.
The region’s political landscape is also different from the one Lula faced when he began his third term in 2023, when allies such as Alberto Fernández in Argentina, Gabriel Boric in Chile and Gustavo Petro in Colombia were in power.
“Lula is unlikely to spend his political capital pushing regional integration initiatives such as Unasur (Union of South American Nations), as he did during his first terms. Lacking ideological allies, he will exercise that leadership through Brazil’s economic weight — its investments, trade and Mercosur,” Paarlberg added, referring to the South American trading bloc.
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Paarlberg also said the reelected president would closely follow the US midterm elections, in which “his position could improve” if Trump’s Republican Party loses control of one or both chambers of Congress, potentially bringing greater scrutiny of the president’s agenda.
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He added that the result also suggests that backing from the White House and its battery of economic measures “are not decisive factors” in an election.
In a Latin America increasingly defined by emerging leaders, Lula remains a statesman with international reach and one of the region’s key figures on the global stage. After another political feat, the record-breaking president has two months before beginning his fourth term to decide what course he will seek to chart for South America’s largest country over the next four years. READ MORE